


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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXV, No. 19

FEBRUARY 22, 1946

U. S. AND RUSSIA MUST OVERCOME MUTUAL SUSPICIONS

PREMIER STALIN's speech of February 9 on the eve of the first elections held in the U.S.S.R. since 1938, has been the subject of far-ranging speculation by Western commentators, some of whom have interpreted it as a warlike challenge to the Western powers and a repudiation of the UNO. Most such speculation has failed to take into account the fact that this was a political campaign speech and, as such, bore marks of the boastful attitude that politicians in all ages and all lands reserve for such occasions. The burden of Stalin's speech was justification not merely of the policies pursued by the Communist party to achieve military victory but, far more significantly, of the contributions made to victory by the party's industrial and agricultural program as embodied in successive Five-Year Plans. It was hardly to be expected that Stalin would laud the capitalist system since he and his associates regard the Soviet system as superior. While Stalin's explanation of the origins of World War II reverted to the usual schematic phrases about the warlike character of capitalist economy, he did point out to his listeners the special totalitarian features of the Axis powers, and the anti-Fascist sentiments that united Russia with other countries fighting a "liberating" war. His failure to mention the contribution made by the Western powers to Soviet victories in terms of food and war equipment was ungracious, but the temptation to take full credit for the military prowess of a nation which as late as 1941 was held in contempt abroad is not easy to resist.

STRESS ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. Stalin, however, was concerned in this speech primarily with domestic rather than foreign affairs. Russia must now resume its huge task of construction where it left off when it was invaded by Germany in 1941—with the added handicaps of wholesale

devastation of German-occupied areas and losses of population estimated at some twenty million. The Soviet government cannot offer its war-weary people rosy dreams of a streamlined Utopia like those conjured up by enthusiastic American advertisers. The generation brought up under the Soviet system has known great hardships and grave physical and spiritual strain. It must be bluntly told to prepare for more of the same. It is natural, under the circumstances, that Stalin should want to stress the value of the sacrifices made in the past. The results, he thinks, speak for themselves—first of all quantitatively, in numbers of planes, guns, tanks, armored cars, and other war material, and in the amounts of food that, he contends, only collective farms could have produced in sufficient quantities. The fact that, like President Kalinin last fall, he makes a special effort to explain why heavy industry had to be given precedence over the production of consumers' goods may be regarded as an answer to soldiers returning from occupied countries who are urging prompt improvements in living standards.

It is in this connection, too, that Stalin strikes the most optimistic note. Rationing, he says, will be abolished "in the very near future"—although he neglected to say that the adoption of this measure, at a time when much of Europe is gravely undernourished, is facilitated by the presence of nearly two and a half million Russian soldiers in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where they live off the land, some of it the richest grain-growing land on the continent. Special attention, Stalin adds, "will be focused on expanding the production of goods for mass consumption, on raising the standard of life of the working people by consistent and systematic reduction of the cost of all goods, and on wide-scale construction of all kinds of scientific research institutes to enable

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science to develop its forces."

Stalin, however, takes pride in other than material achievements. The Communists, he contends, no longer distrust non-party Russians. "Times have changed," and "both Communists and non-party people are fulfilling one common task." He also believes that the "multi-national" Soviet state has successfully stood the test of war and has effectively solved "the national problem and the problem of collaboration among nations." Stalin's emphasis on the "multi-national" character of the Soviet state is not a defiance of UNO, as it has been interpreted in some quarters. Rather it should be studied in connection with the emphasis placed by Pope Pius XII on the "supranational universality" of the Catholic Church in his December 24 allocution announcing the appointment of an unprecedentedly large number of non-Italians to the Sacred College of Cardinals.

IS RUSSIA A MENACE? Is Russia, in the light of this speech, to be considered a menace to the world? Is the only recourse of the United States, as some seemingly responsible Americans aver, to arm grimly for World War III, this time with Russia as the enemy? Much evidence can be adduced in support of an alarmist attitude: the disclosure in Canada of a leakage of secret information, presumably about the atomic bomb or radar, to Russian agents; Russia's reported demands in Manchuria and Iran; and sensational rumors about a projected seizure of Trieste by Russian-backed Yugoslavs. What here is false, what true? To what extent are we and the Russians becoming the victims of our own imaginations?

The efforts of the Western powers to preserve the secret of the atomic bomb—regarded by all Allied scientists as futile—was bound to encourage spying, a pursuit which is not praiseworthy, but can hardly be regarded as a Russian peculiarity. The Russians are clearly determined to get all the advantages they can during this period of transition when no

nation, least of all the United States, has crystallized its policy. At the same time, Russia has given the Western powers a weapon of debate that it must not be surprised to see turned against it. For if the presence of British troops in Greece and Indonesia constitutes a threat to peace, as Russian Foreign Vice-Commissar Vishinsky argued, so does the presence of Russian troops in Manchuria. But we must not forget that we, too, have troops on Chinese soil. For our part, if we want to check the Russians, we must clarify our aims in contested areas. The Yugoslavs are known to have designs on Trieste—there is nothing new in that—and Russia has long wanted to achieve influence in the Mediterranean. But on the other hand, the Western Allies have not been completely free of contacts with anti-Russian elements in Europe—and especially in Italy, where Italian nationalist sentiment—about Trieste finds common ground with the Vatican's denunciation of Russian totalitarianism and Britain's natural desire to maintain its Mediterranean life line?

Mutual suspicions create an atmosphere favorable to war. The wisest thing we can all do today is to air our respective suspicions and make no bones about our respective grievances. A good start in that direction was made in the UNO Security Council, where Russia, far from being lackadaisical, took an active part in all debates and helped to get the discussion on a realistic basis. Russia will continue to make a strong two-fold appeal because of its reiterated sympathy for colonial peoples and the success of its multi-national system, emphasized by Stalin. But surely the United States can meet Russia's challenge on these two points—provided we actively champion the cause of dependent nations, which we have recently failed to do, and strengthen at home the institutions that have made it possible for people from all lands to find here a common heritage of democracy. **VERA MICHELES DEAN**

THREAT OF FAMINE SHARPENS POLITICAL ISSUES IN INDIA

The danger of famine and the sharp political issues now shaping up in India threaten, before many months have passed, to produce a crisis more explosive than any Britain has faced since the end of the war with Germany and Japan. India, with its 400,000,000 people, is the heart of the British Empire, the most important overseas base of Britain's position as a world power. Consequently, what happens there overshadows the many conflicts, admittedly significant in themselves, that have arisen in the Levant, Greece, Indonesia, Egypt and other areas of British imperial interest.

FAMINE FACES 100,000,000. How important India is in human terms is clear from the fact that more than 100,000,000 people are facing the prospect of famine or, at best, a most stringent and

dire shortage of food. As a result of a serious cyclone and drought in the south and failure of the rains in northwest India, the central plateau area and provinces of Bombay and Madras are seriously affected, while the Punjab and Sind will not yield their usual surplus of wheat and rice. In announcing on February 16 that the daily cereals ration would be cut to 12 ounces per person in the urban areas in which rationing is applied, Viscount Wavell, Viceroy of India, declared that India was some 3,000,000 tons short of its food requirements.

The government of India is approaching the food problem on two fronts. Through internal measures, such as the ration cut just mentioned, it is seeking to stretch existing supplies. At the same time it is addressing a special appeal to the authorities in Lon-

don and to the members of the Combined Food Board in Washington for a larger allotment of grain from abroad. It is worth noting, however, that the Indian delegation which will come before the Food Board is weak politically, since the Congress party, India's foremost nationalist organization, declined to participate on the ground that it could place no confidence in the government-selected personnel of the mission.

FOOD AND POLITICS. The economic situation will inevitably fan the fires of political unrest—all the more so since India has long been heading toward a new political crisis. The interplay of food and politics is indicated by the general strike recently held in the textile center of Allahabad, accompanied by a parade of 50,000 persons protesting food-ration cuts, and by the protest meeting of 100,000 persons demonstrating on the food issue in Cawnpore. At the same time Jawaharlal Nehru, second to Gandhi in the leadership of the nationalist movement, has been traveling about India urging the necessity of full independence and of strong popular action in the food crisis.

India, of course, has seethed with political unrest on many occasions, and the ravages of famine have been felt before, most recently in the terrible Bengal famine of 1943. But the current situation differs from previous ones because desperate economic prospects coincide with a political crisis. It will be recalled, for example, that when differences between Britain and the Indian nationalists came to a head in the summer of 1942 after the failure of the Cripps mission, an unusual economic situation was not present to reinforce political discontent. Similarly, at the time of the Bengal famine, when economic issues became unusually serious, organized political discontent was at low ebb. To draw a rough analogy, then, the impending situation resembles what India might have experienced if the Bengal famine had coincided with the crisis following the failure of the Cripps proposals. Moreover, the fact that the war is over tends to lessen the restraints on Indian activity against British rule, while for the first time in many years not only the members of the Congress party, but non-Congress Moslems, are in motion, as recent anti-British riots by Moslems in Calcutta indicate.

CONGRESS AND MOSLEM LEAGUE. On the other hand, sharp differences of view between the Congress party and the Moslem League, leading political organization of the Indian Moslems, may strengthen the British position. The main objective

of the League and its President, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, is to create two independent Moslem states (to which the name *Pakistan* would be given) in the predominantly Moslem areas of northwestern and northeastern India. To the Congress, which advocates a united India, *Pakistan* is unacceptable. This clash of views, of course, is not new, but a change has occurred in the bargaining position of the League. Whereas five years ago the League was an organization claiming to represent all Moslems but actually possessing only a small body of supporters, today it unquestionably has a mass following. Exactly how large this following is remains to be demonstrated in the elections now going on in India.

The first phase of the Indian voting was completed in the latter part of last year with the election of a new Central Legislative Assembly. This body has very limited powers, and is selected by an extremely small number of voters, but it is significant that both the Congress party and the Moslem League won important victories. Of 102 elected members of the Assembly, 56 belong to the Congress and 30 to the Moslem League, and the new President of the body is a Congress representative. Of much more moment, however, are the provincial elections which start this month and end in April. It is on the basis of the provincial elections that the British will seek to establish an all-party Viceroy's Executive Council and to convoke a "constitution-making body" to draw up an Indian constitution. Whether the British proposals on these matters will be acceptable to the Congress party remains to be seen, and Jinnah has declared that the League will not agree to a single constitutional body or a single transitional government preceding independence, since either of these would militate against the achievement of *Pakistan*.

At the moment, of course, the political and economic crisis in India is still a potential one. Much will depend on the actual evolution of food policy, the quantity of grain imports assigned to India, and the policies of Britain, the Congress party and the Moslem League. But it is already clear that the stage is being set for one of the major struggles of the post-war years.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER


The Peoples of Malaysia, by Fay-Cooper Cole. New York, Van Nostrand, 1945. \$4.00

Written by an anthropologist who lived for five and a half years among the peoples he describes, this book is a valuable and entertaining portrayal of the physical characteristics, living habits and social customs of the natives of British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXV, No. 19, FEBRUARY 22, 1946. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, President; DOROTHY F. LEE, Secretary; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



U.S. PRESTIGE IN CHINA IMPAIRED BY SECRET PACT ON MANCHURIA

The disclosure on February 11 that in a secret agreement concluded at Yalta exactly a year before the United States and Britain had recognized special privileges for the Soviet Union in Manchuria has placed on this country new responsibility to harmonize the conflicting interests of China and Russia and assure political stability in an area which was the scene of Japan's initial attack on China. Stability in Manchuria is threatened anew, first because Russia has maintained troops there beyond February 1, the date on which, after Chungking's request for delay, it had agreed to withdraw; and, second, because reports persist that the Soviet government is now seeking to obtain from China economic advantages exceeding those it had claimed under the Yalta agreement. The main provisions of this agreement, it will be recalled, had been embodied in the treaty of friendship and alliance concluded by Russia and China on August 14, 1945.*

RUSSIA'S OLD PRIVILEGES RESTORED. The secret agreement affecting Manchuria, which Secretary of State James F. Byrnes announced, promised the restoration of privileges Russia had lost to Japan—partly as a result of its defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, and partly through Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931-32. The agreement provided for powerful Russian participation in the administration of the port of Dairen, the leasing to Russia of Port Arthur as a naval base, and the establishment of a joint Chinese-Russian company to operate the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria railroads.

To see this agreement in perspective, it must be borne in mind that in 1898 Russia had obtained from China a 25-year lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, on which Dairen and Port Arthur are located, but was forced to surrender the lease to Japan under the terms of the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth. Moreover, Russia had built the Chinese Eastern Railroad in the nineteenth century, and had constructed the South Manchuria Railroad from Changchun to Dairen when it became involved in war with Japan in 1904-05. Russia thus enjoyed, before World War I, most of the privileges whose restoration was assured by the Yalta agreement. At the time of the Bolshevik revolution of November 1917, however, the Soviet leaders, who then vigorously opposed territorial annexations and imperialist privileges, repudiated the Tsarist treaties which had given Russia special rights in China.

SECRET DIPLOMACY. The main question is not

whether Russia is entitled to claim certain special privileges on Chinese territory, or even whether these privileges violate Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. The United States maintains a naval base at Guantanamo Bay without apparently feeling that it violates the sovereignty of Cuba, and expects to maintain a naval base in the Philippines even when the islands have achieved independence. Where the Yalta agreement is open to criticism is that it was concluded without the consent or knowledge of China, whose territorial interests it directly affects.

The agreement thus marks a return to the kind of secret diplomacy President Wilson denounced during World War I—diplomacy which at that time produced the secret Treaty of London between the Western powers and Italy. As in the case of that treaty, the fact that military commitments were involved was regarded as a justification of secrecy. But while the treaty of London promised Italy a share of enemy (Turkish and Austrian) territory in return for Italy's entrance into the war on the side of the Allies, the Yalta agreement promised Russia, in return for its entrance into the war against Japan, certain rights on territory belonging to one of our allies. It is true that China accepted in the treaty of last August the same terms as those embodied in the Yalta agreement. But while T. V. Soong, president of the Executive Yuan who signed that treaty on China's behalf, may have learned of the existence of the Yalta terms during his negotiations, the Chinese government was apparently not informed of these terms in advance, and the world in general was kept in ignorance until the secret agreement was simultaneously announced last week in Washington and London.

The question, then, is not whether China will accept the Yalta terms—it did so in August—but what effect Mr. Byrnes' revelation will have on future relations between the United States, Russia and China. The agreement "makes us, the Chinese people, feel that the meaning of friendship between us, as allies, no longer exists," the Chungking radio said in a broadcast to the United States on February 13. When the United States and Britain offered Russia concessions at China's expense, they were doing so for a purpose they considered of paramount immediate importance—Russia's participation in war against Japan. Now the Western powers are faced with the question whether the price paid at that time may not cost them heavily in terms of China's confidence and good will.

BLAIR BOLLES

*See L. K. Rosinger, "Chinese-Soviet Pact Fosters Big-Four Unity in Far East," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, August 31, 1945.